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We introduce and analyze a purely competitive dynamics for the evolution of an infinite population
subject to a 3-strategy game. We argue that this dynamics represents a characterization of how
certain systems, both natural and artificial, are governed. In each period, the population is randomly
sorted into pairs, which engage in a once-off play of the game; the probability that a member
propagates its type to its offspring is proportional only to its payoff within the pair. We show that
if a type is dominant (obtains higher payoffs in games with both other types), its ‘pure’ population
state, comprising only members of that type, is globally attracting. If there is no dominant type,
there is an unstable ‘mixed’ fixed point; the population state eventually oscillates between the
three near-pure states. We then allow for mutations, where offspring have a non-zero probability of
randomly changing their type. In this case, the existence of a dominant type renders a point near
its pure state globally attracting. If no dominant type exists, a supercritical Hopf bifurcation occurs
at the unique mixed fixed point, and above a critical (typically low) mutation rate, this fixed point
becomes globally attracting: the implication is that even very low mutation rates can stabilize a
system that would, in the absence of mutations, be unstable.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 05.45.-a, 89.65.-s, 87.23.Ge, 87.23.Kg
I. INTRODUCTION
A relatively recent development in the game theory
literature, that of the dynamic treatment of games, has
proven successful in providing answers both to the ques-
tion of which equilibria will arise in a given game, and
how they might be reached; both of these questions have
proven problematic in the static, introspective approach
to game theory [1]. The fundamental idea behind the
dynamic treatment is to consider repetitions of a game,
rather than a once-off play, thus allowing players’ strate-
gies to evolve through time. Rules are posited to govern
the evolution of the players’ strategies, with such rules
being either mindless (occurring exogenous to any deci-
sion making of the players – we call such a rule a ‘dy-
namics’) or minded (where the rule depends explicitly
on players’ decisions – we call such a rule a ‘learning
rule’). Different interpretations of the same game might
render the same rule either mindless or minded, so that
the distinction is not clearly set.
Our focus in this paper will be on a particular rule,
which, as we shall discuss, can be interpreted either as a
dynamics or a learning rule. Such rules are often most
comfortably cast in the language of (biological) evolu-
tion, and it is such a description, for the most part, that
we shall employ. Typically, a population of agents is con-
sidered, with each agent being one of a number of types
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(the types correspond to strategies). In each period, a
subset of the population is paired up, with each pair en-
gaging in a once-off play of the game (which might be
termed a fight, a mating, etc., depending on the general
interpretation). The result of the pairings and engage-
ments determines the make-up of the population in the
next period, when the process is repeated.
The dynamics thus provides a vehicle by which an out-
come of the game (the long term make-up of the popu-
lation, for example) may be reached. For many sensibly
founded dynamics (there are conditions for what consti-
tutes a ‘sensible’ dynamics, typically based on the general
principle that relative success of a certain type/strategy
should lead to its increase as a proportion of the popula-
tion – for more technical definitions, a good reference is
Samuelson [2]) this outcome tends to correspond to some
of the equilibrium concepts defined for once-off games, al-
though it is not unusual for this not to be the case. That
is, a sensible dynamics may result in an equilibrium that
is not even Nash (see later in the present paper, as well
as Fudenberg and Levine [1]).
It is instructive, in terms of understanding the nature
of a typical dynamics and also to provide a foundation
and a foil for the model that we develop in the main part
of the present paper, briefly to describe what is proba-
bly the most well-known and widely-applied dynamics,
the ‘replicator dynamics’, first introduced by Taylor and
Jonker [3]. An infinite population comprising n types of
agent is assumed; the population state is defined as the
proportions of each type in the population:
p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn) ∈ ∆n,
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2where ∆n is the unit simplex in Rn:
∆n :=
{
p ∈ Rn : p ≥ 0 ∧
n∑
i=1
pi = 1
}
.
A type’s ‘fitness’ at a given time is defined as the ex-
pected payoff to one of its agents in a once-off game with
a randomly selected opponent from the population; the
proportional growth rate of a given type’s proportion at
a given time is equal to the difference between that type’s
fitness and the average fitness throughout the entire pop-
ulation.
The key concept behind the replicator dynamics is of
the fitness of types within the population. This is deter-
mined not only by how a certain type fares against other
types, but also by how well agents of that type do in en-
gagements with agents of the same type. Indeed, this is
a vital consideration in the concept of evolutionary sta-
bility under the replicator dynamics – a population state
comprising only one type of agent is resistant to inva-
sions by other types if, and only if, the predominant type
fares better against itself than the potential invader does
against the predominant type [4]. This is clearly a sensi-
ble consideration in modeling certain systems; it has been
argued that the replicator dynamics provides a model for
some aspects of evolution in the natural world [5], where
a type whose agents do very poorly amongst themselves
would not be expected to succeed in increasing as a pro-
portion of the population, while a type whose agents do
very well amongst themselves would be expected at least
to be able to maintain a high proportional representation
in the population.
However, in certain circumstances, this ‘cooperation’
consideration is not a natural one; there exist instances
where the success of a type does not depend at all on
how well agents of that type do amongst each other, but
only on how well agents of that type do against agents of
other types. It is dynamics of this type that we consider
in the present paper.
‘Purely competitive dynamics’, as we shall term them,
arise most directly in a knock-out tournament where a
large population comprising a certain number of types
is paired up in each round, with each pair engaging in a
once-off game from which only one of each pair advances,
with a contestant’s probability of advancing depending
on his relative payoff in his engagement. Here, the suc-
cess of a given type (as measured by the proportion of
remaining contestants that are of that type) is invari-
ant to how agents of that type fare against each other.
Purely competitive dynamics could also model a learning
rule where, in a population of distinct behavioral types,
offspring emulate the behavior of their more successful
parent. If an offspring’s parents are of the same type,
it is clear that the offspring will be of that type; there
is propagative competition only between parents of dif-
fering types. Later in the paper, we shall discuss these
examples in the specific context of our model.
A relatively new consideration in the game theory lit-
erature is that of the effect of mutations (generally speak-
ing, the random changing of types within the population,
though mutations have been variously defined) on the dy-
namics of evolutionary models. The interest in the effect
of mutations lies not just in their natural applications –
mutation at a genetic level is one of the key features driv-
ing biological evolution [6] – but also in their interpreta-
tion in terms of imperfect memory, experimentation, and
bounded rationality [7]. Mutations have been shown to
have qualitatively significant effects on the long-run dy-
namics of a number of models [see e.g. Refs. 8–10]; in
this paper, we shall give some attention to the effect of
mutations on our competitive dynamics.
The balance of the paper is structured as follows. Sec.
II sets out the general model – a sensible characteriza-
tion of purely competitive dynamics as described above
– while the sections thereafter investigate the behavior
of the population state under the dynamics in the con-
text of 3-type games (governed by 3× 3 matrices), which
have the simultaneous benefits of offering a rich set of
possible dynamics and of being easily characterized and
illustrated. Sec. III analyzes the dynamics without muta-
tions; we show that, under some simplifying assumptions,
the behavior of the population state can, qualitatively, be
fully characterized. In Sec. IV, we investigate the effect
of mutations on our dynamics. We show that even low
mutation rates can have a nontrivial effect on the behav-
ior of the system; the nature of this effect is typically to
stabilize the system in a way that, again, is qualitatively
understood. Finally, Sec. V concludes, and offers some
possibilities for future study.
II. THE MODEL
A. Description of model
We assume a population of N agents, each of which
is assigned a pure strategy from the strategy set
S = {s1, s2, s3}; an agent will be said to be ‘of type i’
if it is assigned si. The state of the population in period
t is defined by the proportions of the respective types
in the population; we shall denote the population state
at time t by pt := (p1t, p2t, p3t) ∈ ∆3. The 3 × 3 payoff
matrix for the game to which the strategies are relevant
is given by U, so that the payoff to a type i agent in a
once-off play with a type j agent is uij . We require that
the elements of U be strictly positive, and that no two
opposite elements be equal (the first of these assumptions
is fundamental, as will shortly be seen; the second is not
as important, but is rather for convenience).
In each period, a proportion of the population is se-
lected and randomly arranged into pairs. The proportion
of the population that is selected in a given period will
depend on the individual probabilities of selection of the
three types, which in turn depend on the population state
in the period. Defining σi : ∆
3 → [0, 1], we denote by
φi(pt) the probability that a type i agent is selected for
pairing in period t. Two possibilities immediately present
3themselves for consideration. The first is φi ≡ 1 ∀ i, i.e.
that in each period, regardless of the population state,
each agent is selected for pairing. In a biological context,
this would be referred to as a population in which there
is zero ‘selection pressure’ [11]. The second is that an
agent’s probability of selection is proportional to its ex-
pected payoff – the strength or fitness of its type in the
given population state – so that φi(p) ∝ eiUp (ei ∈ R3
denotes the ith canonical basis element of R3).
Once the pairs are selected, each pair engages in a
once-off play of the game, the outcome of which is the
production of two offspring, who replace their parents in
the population and enter into the next period (so that the
population size remains unchanged). The two offspring
of a given pairing are of the same type, with that type
determined as follows:
prob [offsp. type k | parents type i, j] = δiku
θ
ij + δjku
θ
ji
uθij + u
θ
ji
,
where θ > 0 is a constant, and δab is the Kronecker delta
(δab = 1 if a = b, else δab = 0). It should be noted
here that this expression is not arbitrary; it is motivated
primarily by the intuitive appeal of two cases, θ = 1
and θ =∞. Taking θ = 1, as we shall throughout this
paper, the probability that the offspring of a pairing of
a type 1 agent and a type 2 agent are of type 1, for
example, is proportional to the payoff the type 1 parent
receives in the pairing. On the other hand, in the limiting
case θ =∞, the offspring assume with certainty the type
of the parent with the higher payoff. The parameter θ
therefore governs the transmission from relative strength
in a mating pair to probability of propagating one’s type
in mating.
Often, studies of evolutionary dynamics allow for mu-
tation. We generalize our model by assuming that each
offspring, after it inherits a type from its parents but be-
fore it enters the population for the next period, changes
its type with (fixed) probability µ ≥ 0, with each of the
other two types equally likely.
In the analysis that follows, for convenience, we shall
assume an infinite population, i.e. N = ∞; the finite-
population case is less tractable, and we relegate its con-
sideration to a brief discussion in the concluding section.
We shall also focus exclusively on the case φi ≡ 1; the
case of φi(p) ∝ eiUp will be investigated in a later study
by the authors. Finally, as already mentioned, we assume
θ = 1 throughout.
B. Possible interpretations
Though not specifically constituted to emulate a bi-
ological process, the model developed above does lend
itself to a number of biological interpretations.
Assume, for example, that each agent represents an an-
imal that is genetically programmed to play some pure
strategy, i.e. to exhibit a specific behavior or trait. The
model could then describe the dynamics of intrasexual se-
lection within a population [see e.g. Refs. 12–14]: a single
play of the game pits two animals – and indirectly, the
genes that code for their respective behaviors – against
each other; the animals whose strategies receive higher
payoffs within their pairings typically go on to mate and
to propagate their genetic material to the next genera-
tion, while the weaker animals typically do not. For con-
sistency with the assumption of a fixed population size,
we could assume full generational replacement and that
victorious animals each produce two offspring, as sug-
gested in Sec. II A; alternatively, we could assume that
competition eliminates the losing animals from the pop-
ulation, in which case each victor need only produce a
single offspring. (To obviate such contrivances, we might
simply generalize the model to allow for a variable pop-
ulation size.) The parameter θ governs the probability
that a weaker competitor beats a stronger competitor:
for θ =∞, stronger competitors will always emerge vic-
torious, whereas for 0 < θ <∞, there is a nonzero prob-
ability of weaker competitors beating stronger ones (on
average, though, stronger competitors will still win more
often). A number of interpretations for µ > 0 are possi-
ble, perhaps the simplest being that a nonzero mutation
rate corresponds directly to random mutation at a ge-
nomic level.
In any event, the competitive nature of the dynamics is
clear: the success of a given strategy depends only on how
well it fairs against other types. This is a sensible charac-
terization of intrasexual selection: if two animals playing
the same strategy are competing for a mate, the payoff
within the interaction is irrelevant in the sense that, one
way or another, the set of genes that codes for their com-
mon strategy (behavior, trait, etc.) will be propagated
to the next generation. Of course, if the animals survive
for more than one generation, and generations are suffi-
ciently close together, a low common payoff in encoun-
ters with their same type might render them weaker in
subsequent generations; if this is the case, the replicator
dynamics (for example) might be more appropriate.
Though the natural description of our model makes
use of biological terminology (‘offspring’, ‘parents’, ‘mat-
ing’, etc.), there are many more general competitive in-
teractions which could conceivably be described by the
same model. Consider a boxing tournament, for exam-
ple. Agents playing the three different strategies could
correspond, conveniently, to the three commonly defined
styles of boxer: the ‘swarmer’, the ‘slugger’, and the ‘out-
fighter’ [15]. Boxers are paired up at each stage, with
one of the boxers in each pairing advancing to the next
round, and the other being eliminated; our dynamics fea-
tures the sensible condition that a boxer’s probability of
advancing to the next round is dependent purely on that
boxer’s strength relative to his opponent. (To keep the
number of boxers constant at N , we could specify that,
in advancing to the next round, a boxer earns two fights
for that round.)
Furthermore, as already noted, the distinction between
4mindless and minded rules is not clearly set, and our
model can be thought of as describing a process of social
or observational learning [16–18], rather than a mind-
less competitive interaction (somewhat surprisingly, the
modeling of such social behavior is of increasing concern
in the context of statistical physics [19]).
In the social learning paradigm, players can learn only
from existing players in the population, i.e. by observ-
ing the interaction between other players, or by ‘asking
around’. For example, we might suppose that each gener-
ation, new agents (perhaps, but not necessarily, offspring
of current agents) enter the population, with each new
agent making a once-and-for-all choice of strategy based
on an observation of a play of the game between an exit-
ing agent and one other agent drawn randomly from the
population. Sensibly, the new agent will be more likely
to emulate the strategy which received the higher payoff
in the observed interaction: for θ = ∞, the new agent
will emulate with certainty the strategy observed to be
more successful; θ < ∞ could be explained in terms of
imperfect observation, while µ > 0 could be explained in
terms of experimentation.
Alternatively, instead of assuming that agents are peri-
odically replaced, we could assume that agents are mem-
oryless or that they consider past experience irrelevant
to their current situation: for example, an agent might
stick to its strategy until it is paired up with an opponent
who receives a higher payoff than it does, in which case
it will adopt the strategy of its opponent [1].
Given these additional interpretations in an observa-
tional learning framework, the dynamics might well be
referred to as an ‘emulation dynamics’; nevertheless, the
competitive nature of the dynamics remains clear.
III. THE CASE OF NO MUTATIONS
As noted, we make the following assumptions through-
out the paper: φi(p) = 1 ∀ p ∈ ∆3, i = 1, 2, 3; θ = 1;
and N = ∞. In this section we shall also assume µ = 0
(no mutations). Some noteworthy features of the game
under these assumptions are listed below.
1. Since φi(p) ≡ 1 for i = 1, 2, 3, the diagonal ele-
ments of the payoff matrix U are irrelevant: when
a type i parent meets another type i parent, their
offspring are guaranteed to be of type i. Thus, we
are free to normalize the diagonal elements of U as
we wish – the dynamics will be unaffected.
2. Multiplying opposite elements of U by the same
factor leaves the effects of the dynamics unchanged;
the probability that an offspring is of type i, if its
parents are of types i and j, is invariant to multi-
plying uij and uji by some factor λ. This factor can
be unique for different pairs of opposite elements.
Thus, we are free to scale opposite elements in the
payoff matrix without fear of altering the dynamics.
It will turn out that a convenient normalization of the
payoff matrix U→ U˜ is given by:
u˜ij :=
uij
uij + uji
.
This normalization obeys the conditions set out in notes
(1) and (2) above – it is equivalent to setting all diagonal
elements to 1
2
, and scaling off-diagonal opposite elements
uij and uji by the factor λ = (uij + uji)
−1 – so that the
trajectories of the population state under U will be iden-
tical to those under U˜. The benefit of this normalization
is that, for i 6= j, u˜ij is simply the probability that a
pairing of a type i agent and a type j agent will yield
offspring of type i.
A. Stage-to-stage dynamics
Assume that the population state at time t is pt =
(p1t, p2t, p3t). Consider the possible pairings that could
give rise to type 1 offspring, assuming that there are no
mutations (µ = 0):
• type 1 - type 1, giving rise to type 1 offspring with
probability 1 – the probability that a random pair-
ing is of this type is p21t;
• type 1 - type 2, giving rise to type 1 offspring with
probability u˜12 – the probability that a random
pairing is of this type is 2p1tp2t; and
• type 1 - type 3, giving rise to type 1 offspring with
probability u˜13 – the probability that a random
pairing is of this type is 2p1tp3t.
In an infinite population, the proportion of each pair-
ing possibility amongst all other possibilities corresponds
exactly with its probability; also, for a given pairing type-
combination, the proportion of such meetings that result
in type 1 offspring corresponds exactly to the probabil-
ity that a pairing of that type-combination yields type
1 offspring. Thus, in the case of an infinite population
with no mutations, we have the following exact update
formula for p1:
p1,t+1 = p
2
1t + 2p1tp2tu˜12 + 2p1tp3tu˜13.
(For the finite population case, we would have to make
use of expected value operators.)
The update formulae for p2 and p3 are reached
similarly, and we arrive at the update formula for the
population state as a whole:


p1,t+1 = p
2
1t + 2p1tp2tu˜12 + 2p1tp3tu˜13
p2,t+1 = p
2
2t + 2p2tp1tu˜21 + 2p2tp3tu˜23
p3,t+1 = p
2
3t + 2p3tp1tu˜31 + 2p3tp2tu˜32.
(1)
5In Sec. IV we shall augment the above update formula
to account for mutations; in that case, offspring of a given
type can result from any pairing.
B. Fixed points and their stability
A fixed point is a population state which, under the
dynamics, persists through time.
Definition 1. The population state p is a fixed point if
pt = p ⇒ pt+1 = p.
Note that the assumption of an infinite population al-
lows us to ignore the stochastic element of the dynamics
in characterizing such points.
In discussing the stability of fixed points, a key con-
cept is that of ‘evolutionary stability’ [20, 21]. Loosely,
a fixed point exhibits evolutionary stability if, after the
introduction into the population of any group of agents
of slightly different proportional make-up, the population
state moves back to the initial population state (the fixed
point). In other words, for all perturbations smaller than
a given size, the population state eventually returns to
the fixed point.
Definition 2. Let p be a fixed point. p is evolutionarily
stable (hereafter ‘ES’) if ∃ ε > 0 such that
pt ∈ B∆3(p, ε) ⇒ lim
τ→∞
pt+τ = p.
(Here, as hereafter, we denote by B∆n(p, ε) the open
ball on ∆n of radius ε, centered at p ∈ ∆n; that is,
B∆n(p, ε) := {x ∈ ∆n : ||x− p|| < ε}, where || · || is the
Euclidean norm in Rn.)
Finally, we shall call a fixed point ‘globally attracting’
if, for any initial population state away from the other
fixed points, the population state converges to that fixed
point.
Definition 3. Let p be a fixed point, along with
p1,p2, . . . ,pm. p is globally attracting if:
pt ∈ ∆3\{p1, . . . ,pm} ⇒ lim
τ→∞
pt+τ = p.
It is clear that any globally attracting isolated fixed
point is also ES.
We shall begin our identification and classification of
the fixed points with the following trivial result:
Theorem 1. If µ = 0, the population states e1, e2 and
e3 are fixed points.
Proof. If there are only type i agents in the population
(p = ei), pairings comprise only type i agents, and thus,
with no mutations, only type i offspring will be produced.
This state will persist.
We shall now consider the evolutionary stability of
these ‘pure’ states. We shall describe the conditions un-
der which a pure state can be ES, and show that ES
pure states are in fact globally attracting as well. We
shall then show that at most one of the pure states can
be ES, and describe the conditions under which none of
the pure states is ES.
Theorem 2. The fixed point p = ei is ES if, and only
if, u˜ij >
1
2
∀ j 6= i (equivalently, uij > uji ∀ j 6= i).
Moreover, if u˜ij >
1
2
∀ j 6= i, then e1, e2, e3 are the only
fixed points, and p = ei is globally attracting.
Proof. (⇐) Without loss of generality, assume u˜12, u˜13 >
1
2
, and let the current population state be pt =
(p1t, p2t, p3t) 6= e2, e3. We shall demonstrate that
lim
τ→∞
p1,t+τ = 1; that is, the population returns to the
pure state e1.
From (1), we have the following update formula for p1:
p1,t+1 = p
2
1t + 2p1tp2tu˜12 + 2p1tp3tu˜13
= p1t (p1t + 2p2tu˜12 + 2p3tu˜13)
≥ p1t
(
p1t + 2p2t(
1
2
) + 2p3t(
1
2
)
)
= p1t (p1t + p2t + p3t) = p1t.
We have equality in the third line if, and only if,
p2t = p3t = 0 (we have already assumed p1t 6= 0).
So for all non-pure population states at time t, the
p1 component is strictly monotonically increasing over
time, so none is a fixed point, and thus lim
τ→∞
p1,t+τ = 1.
The population state e1 is therefore globally attracting,
and by implication, ES too.
(⇒) Suppose, without loss of generality, that u˜12 < 12 .
We shall show that the pure state p = e1 is not resistant
to the invasion of type 2 agents; in particular, we shall
show that, for any population state pt = ξe2 + (1− ξ)e1
where ξ ∈ (0, 1), the component p1 decreases in time.
The update formula for the p1 component of p in a
population where p1t, p2t > 0 and p3t = 0 is given by:
p1,t+1 = p
2
1t + 2p1tp2tu˜12
= p1t (p1t + 2p2tu˜12)
< p1t
(
p1t + 2p2t(
1
2
)
)
= p1t (p1t + p2t) = p1t;
that is, p1 is strictly monotonically decreasing in time.
So, any perturbation away from the initial state p = e1
along that support of ∆3 where p3 = 0 will ensure that
the population state does not return to e1. Since any
open ball B∆3(e1, ε) contains such points, the pure state
p = e1 is not ES.
Fig. 1(a) on pg. 7 contains a phase portrait showing
some typical trajectories for the case of an ES pure state.
In this ‘ternary diagram’, as hereafter, the right, top and
left vertices of the simplex correspond to the pure pop-
ulation states e1, e2 and e3 respectively. The scaling for
6each component of the population state is along the per-
pendicular dropped from the vertex corresponding to its
pure state to the side opposite that vertex.
The case u˜12, u˜13 >
1
2
, which the previous theorem
shows to be both necessary and sufficient for the pure
state p = e1 to be ES, does not permit any other pure
state to be ES. (For e2 to be ES, the above theorem
would require u˜21 >
1
2
, which contradicts u˜12 >
1
2
. The
requirements for e3 to be ES lead to a similar contradic-
tion.) So we can have at most one pure state ES fixed
point. We shall call the type associated with such a state
the ‘dominant type’; the conditions required of the payoff
matrix for its existence and the result in Thm. 2 justify
this nomenclature.
It is interesting to note that the evolutionarily stable
fixed point in this case need not correspond to a Nash
equilibrium of the static game; indeed, the globally at-
tracting pure state can even correspond to a strategy
that is strictly dominated in the static game! Take, for
example, the following payoff matrix:
U =

 2 6 74 8 8
3 2 5

 .
Under our dynamics, the pure state of type 1 agents is
globally attracting, despite the fact that strategy 1 is
strictly dominated by strategy 2. This may be under-
stood by noting that the competitive dynamics requires
us to consider opposite elements in the payoff matrix
rather than those above and below each other, as the
traditional concept of dominance does.
Another consequence of Thm. 2 is that there exist cases
where no ES pure state exists. These are the cases where
none of the types is dominant:
(i) u˜12 >
1
2
, u˜13 <
1
2
, u˜23 >
1
2
;
(ii) u˜12 <
1
2
, u˜13 >
1
2
, u˜23 <
1
2
.
A suitable permutation of the indices equates the two
cases, so we can take, say, the first to be general. Here,
type 1 ‘beats’ type 2, which ‘beats’ type 3, which ‘beats’
type 1. In this case, the game mirrors the classic rock-
paper-scissors game of the game theory literature – see,
for example, Hofbauer and Sigmund [4].
We now turn our attention to non-pure state fixed
points. We know from Thm. 2 that such fixed points
are not possible if one of the fixed points is ES, so we
need only consider the case where no ES pure state ex-
ists, the general form of which we have taken to be case
(i) above.
The theorem below establishes that, in such a case, a
unique non-pure state fixed point always exists, and that
it lies in the interior of ∆3. The subsequent theorem will
show that this interior fixed point can not be ES.
Theorem 3. If u˜12 >
1
2
, u˜13 <
1
2
, u˜23 >
1
2
, then:
(a) ∃! p ∈ ∆3\{e1, e2, e3} such that pt = p ⇒ pt+1 =
p;
(b) p ∈ int(∆3).
Proof. We shall derive the conditions for such a fixed
point to exist, and demonstrate that a unique point in
∆3\{e1, e2, e3} fulfils these conditions. Assume that p ∈
int(∆3) is our candidate for an interior fixed point. (We
shall consider the case where p ∈ bd(∆3)\{e1, e2, e3}
later, and demonstrate that such a point can not be
fixed.) Applying the update formula for pt+1, and sub-
stituting in the fixed point condition that pt+1 = pt = p,
we arrive at the following system of equations:

p1 = p
2
1 + 2p1p2u˜12 + 2p1p3u˜13
p2 = p
2
2 + 2p2p1u˜21 + 2p2p3u˜23
p3 = p
2
3 + 2p3p1u˜31 + 2p3p2u˜32
⇒


1 = p1 + 2p2u˜12 + 2p3u˜13
1 = p2 + 2p1u˜21 + 2p3u˜23
1 = p3 + 2p1u˜31 + 2p2u˜32
⇒ 2U˜p = (1, 1, 1),
where we used the fact that the components of p are
nonzero in dividing them out in the second step. Taking
into account the conditions p1+p2+p3 = 1 and u˜ij+u˜ji =
1, we arrive at the following linear system:

1/2 u˜12 u˜13
1− u˜12 1/2 u˜23
1− u˜13 1− u˜23 1/2
1 1 1



 p1p2
p3

 =


1/2
1/2
1/2
1

 .
The above system turns out to be consistent; the unique
solution is given by:
p1 =
1− 2u˜23
1− 2(u˜12 − u˜13 + u˜23) ,
p2 =
2u˜13 − 1
1− 2(u˜12 − u˜13 + u˜23) , (2)
p3 =
1− 2u˜12
1− 2(u˜12 − u˜13 + u˜23) .
It remains to be shown that p1, p2, p3 > 0. Note that
u˜12 − u˜13 + u˜23 > 12 , so that 1 − 2(u˜12 − u˜13 + u˜23) < 0.
We thus require the numerators above to be negative; it
is readily verified that this is the case. Thus, p ∈ int(∆3),
and so, under the assumptions concerning U˜ that forbid
an ES pure state, there always exists a unique fixed point
in the interior of ∆3; it is given by (2).
Finally, we consider the case where p ∈
bd(∆3)\{e1, e2, e3}. Assume, without loss of gen-
erality, that p3 = 0, so that p1, p2 > 0, with p1 + p2 = 1.
Our system of equations incorporating the fixed point
condition is then

p1 = p
2
1 + 2p1p2u˜12
p2 = p
2
2 + 2p2p1u˜21
1 = p1 + p2
⇒
{
(1− 2u˜12)p1 = 1− 2u˜12
(1− 2u˜12)p1 = 0.
This is consistent only if u˜12 =
1
2
, which we have assumed
not to be the case. Thus, the only fixed points on the
boundary of ∆3 are the pure states.
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FIG. 1. A few representative trajectories for the case (a) where the existence of a dominant type leads to an ES pure state;
and a typical trajectory for the case (b) where no dominant type exists, resulting in a locally-unstable interior fixed point.
So we have found the conditions under which an in-
terior fixed point exists; it remains to characterize the
stability of this interior fixed point. The following result
establishes that the interior fixed point is never ES.
Theorem 4. If an interior fixed point p exists, then
∀ ε > 0, ∃ p′ ∈ B∆3(p, ε) such that pt = p′ ⇒
lim
τ→∞
pt+τ 6= p.
Proof. Suppose, without loss of generality, that u˜12 >
1
2
, u˜13 <
1
2
, u˜23 >
1
2
, so that we have the interior fixed
point given by (2), which we call p ∈ int(∆3).
Taking into account the restrictions that the propor-
tions sum to unity, and that opposite elements of U˜ sum
to unity, the third equation in (1) becomes redundant,
and the system may be written in two dimensions:
p1,t+1 = p1t [p1t(1− 2u˜13) + 2p2t(u˜12 − u˜13) + 2u˜13]
=: F1(p1t, p2t);
p2,t+1 = p2t [2p1t(1− u˜12 − u˜23) + p2t(1 − 2u˜23) + 2u˜23]
=: F2(p1t, p2t).
p, understood in this context to be the vector compris-
ing the first two elements of the original three-element
p, is a fixed point of this system. To determine the
stability of this fixed point, we employ the usual lin-
earization method [e.g. Ref. 22]: if we can show that
at least one of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix
∂(F1, F2)/∂(p1t, p2t), evaluated at the fixed point, has
modulus greater than unity, then the fixed point is un-
stable. Defining D := 1 − 2(u˜12 − u˜13 + u˜23) < 0, these
eigenvalues may, with some effort, be shown to be:
λ1,2 = 1± i
√
(2u˜12 − 1)(1− 2u˜13)(2u˜23 − 1)
−D = 1± i
√
ω,
where 0 < ω := −(2u˜12 − 1)(1 − 2u˜13)(2u˜23 − 1)/D <
1. So, the eigenvalues are distinct and complex, with
modulus greater than unity:
|λ1,2|2 = 1 + ω > 1.
The fixed point is therefore locally unstable, i.e. not ES,
and the trajectories nearby are outward spirals. On the
unit simplex ∆3, these trajectories translate into outward
spirals.
A typical outward-spiraling trajectory is presented in
Fig. 1(b).
A numerical investigation such as that carried out in
the following section (and explained in greater detail
there) reveals this outward spiral to have as a limit cycle
the boundary of the simplex. The limiting behavior of
the system, then, is oscillatory: the proportion of type
1 agents increases to nearly unity (with a near zero pro-
portion of type 2 and type 3 agents), after which the pro-
portion of type 2 agents increases to nearly unity, after
which the proportion of type 3 agents increases to nearly
unity, and so on. This oscillatory long-run behavior of
the population state is similar to that under the replica-
tor dynamics for rock-paper-scissors games [4]; this is un-
surprising because, as previously noted, the payoff logic
behind the current case in our dynamics mirrors that of
the rock-paper-scissors game.
Under some observational learning interpretations of
our model, this oscillatory behavior might be regarded
as unrealistic: rational agents should eventually realize
that the system is locked in a perpetual cycle, so that
more sophisticated learning rules would be needed for
the system to converge [1].
8IV. THE CASE OF A NONZERO MUTATION
RATE
We now consider the effect of a nonzero mutation rate
µ > 0, maintaining our assumptions of an infinite popu-
lation and non-discriminatory selection. The salient dif-
ference between this case and the previous case, where
we assumed no mutations, is that type i offspring can re-
sult from any pairing. There are, for example, two ways
in which a type 1 offspring can result from the pairing of
a type 1 agent with a type 2 agent: the parents can ini-
tially produce type 1 offspring (probability u˜12) which do
not subsequently mutate (probability 1−µ), or they can
initially produce type 2 offspring (probability u˜21) which
mutate into type 1 offspring (probability µ/2, since it is
equally likely that they will mutate into type 3 agents).
Considering all possible pairings by which offspring of
each type may be produced, and again relying on the
infinite population assumption, we obtain the following
(simplified) update formula for the population state:


p1,t+1 =
(
1− 3µ
2
) (
p21t + 2p1tp2tu˜12 + 2p1tp3tu˜13
)
+ µ
2
p2,t+1 =
(
1− 3µ
2
) (
p22t + 2p1tp2tu˜21 + 2p2tp3tu˜23
)
+ µ
2
p3,t+1 =
(
1− 3µ
2
) (
p23t + 2p1tp3tu˜31 + 2p2tp3tu˜32
)
+ µ
2
.
(3)
In a biological context, we can expect mutation rates to
be very low, i.e. µ≪ 1 [see e.g. 23, 24]; here, the weakest
restriction we shall assume is µ < 2/3, though typical
mutation rates will be much lower. Note that if µ > 2/3,
we have a perverse scenario where complete dominance
of one type in a given period (say, p1t = 1) results in
that type being the minority in the next period (p1,t+1 <
p2,t+1, p3,t+1). We shall see that the nonzero mutation
rate renders finding and characterizing the fixed points
more complicated than before – for example, the µ/2
term at the far right of each equation in (3) prevents us
from factorizing pit, if nonzero, out of the right hand side
of the ith equation.
Before a more rigorous analysis, we might make some
initial remarks and hypotheses regarding the fixed points
of the system, and their stability, under (3):
1. The pure states p = ei are no longer fixed points:
a population comprising only type i agents, will, in
the initial reproduction stage, produce only type i
agents, but will see a proportion µ of these offspring
mutate to other types, rendering the resultant pop-
ulation state ‘mixed’.
2. If U˜ is such that ei would be an ES fixed point
in the case without mutations (Thm. 2), we might
expect there to be an ES fixed point (or at least
an invariant set) near ei under the dynamics that
allows for mutations.
3. If U˜ is such that there would be an interior fixed
point in the case without mutations (Thm. 3), then
we might expect a similar fixed point in the case
with mutations. It is not clear whether this point,
if it were to exist, would be stable or not.
We begin the more detailed analysis by rewriting (3),
taking into account the restrictions p1 + p2 + p3 = 1
and u˜ij = 1 − u˜ji; under these restrictions, the third
equation turns out to be solved identically if the first
two are solved, and the system simplifies to:

p1,t+1 − p1t = p1t
(
1− 3µ
2
) (
(1− p1t)(2u˜13 − 1)
p1,t+1 − p1t =µ2 (1− 3p1t) + 2p2t(u˜12 − u˜13)
)
p2,t+1 − p2t = p2t
(
1− 3µ
2
) (
2p1t(1− u˜12 − u˜23)
p2,t+1 − p2t =µ2 (1− 3p2t) + (1− p2t)(2u˜23 − 1)
)
.
(4)
A. Existence of feasible fixed points
For a fixed point, the left hand sides of the above
equations are zero; this leaves a system of two non-
homogeneous quadratic forms in p1 and p2 (we may drop
the time indices):


[− (1− 3µ
2
)
(2u˜13 − 1)− 2
(
1− 3µ
2
)
(u˜12 − u˜13)p2
+ 3µ
2
] p1 +
(
1− 3µ
2
)
(2u˜13 − 1) p21 − µ2 = 0[− (1− 3µ
2
)
(2u˜23 − 1)− 2
(
1− 3µ
2
)
(1− u˜12 − u˜23)p1
+ 3µ
2
] p2 +
(
1− 3µ
2
)
(2u˜23 − 1) p22 − µ2 = 0.
(5)
From this system, we expect four solutions for p =
(p1, p2, 1 − p1 − p2), though of course these need not lie
on the unit simplex; this would require p1 ≥ 0, p2 ≥
0, p1 + p2 ≤ 1.
Though analytical results have been derived, these re-
sults are generally intractable (involving enormous ex-
pansions which do not seem amenable to simplification
even with the aid of a computer algebra system) and thus
we shall present numerical results only.
For each setup (u˜12, u˜13, u˜23, µ), we ask two questions:
1. How many, if any, fixed points lie on the unit sim-
plex ∆3?
2. For each of the fixed points that do lie on ∆3, is
the fixed point stable or unstable in terms of the
definitions set out earlier?
To solve for the fixed points of the system, we note
that the above system can be written in the general form{
a1 + a2p1 + a3p1p2 + a4p
2
1 = 0
b1 + b2p2 + b3p1p2 + b4p
2
2 = 0.
(6)
9Assume for now that none of the pi, ai, bi is zero. Then
we may solve for p2 in the first equation in (6):
p2 = − 1
a3
(
a1
p1
+ a2 + a4p1
)
. (7)
Substituting this result into the second equation in (6)
and simplifying yields a quartic polynomial in p1:
a21b4 + (2a1a2b4 − a1a3b2)p1 + (a23b1 − a2a3b2 − a1a3b3
+ a22b4 + 2a1a4b4)p
2
1 + (2a2a4b4 − a3a4b2 − a2a3b3)p31
+ (a24b4 − a3a4b3)p41 = 0. (8)
For each set of coefficients, (8) has four (not necessarily
distinct, and not necessarily real) solutions, each of which
corresponds to a solution for p2, as determined by (7).
p3 is then determined by p3 = 1− p1 − p2.
In this way, using a numerical approach (e.g. finding
the eigenvalues of the polynomial’s characteristic matrix)
we may efficiently find, for each combination of param-
eter values, the roots of (5). We may then investigate
whether any of these roots lies on the unit simplex.
We looped the elements of U˜ using a step size of 0.001,
making sure that none of the assumptions was violated,
and we looped µ between – but not including – its as-
sumed limits (0, 2/3) using a step size of 0.001. The key
result of this investigation is that, for each setup ( ex-
actly one solution (i.e. one fixed point of the system) lies
on ∆3. Moreover, in each case, that solution lies in the
interior of ∆3.
B. Stability
For each setup, we have a unique fixed point on the
unit simplex. We may analyze the stability of the fixed
point making use of the usual Jacobian analysis, as we
did in Sec. III B - here, though, our analysis will be nu-
merical. For each setup, we shall numerically calculate
the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix, evaluated at the
feasible fixed point.
1. The case of a dominant type
We took u˜12, u˜13 >
1
2
as the general case that resulted
in ES pure states when µ = 0. With no mutations, such
setups lead to the population state p = e1 being a glob-
ally attracting fixed point.
In this and other cases, the limiting case µ → 0+ will
yield behavior identical to that of the case µ = 0. The
practical implication of this is that, for sufficiently low
mutation rates, the behavior of the system will be prac-
tically identical to that with no mutations.
For sufficiently large mutation rates, however, and for
certain setups, the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix,
evaluated at the interior fixed point, are complex, with
modulus strictly less than unity, so that the behavior near
the fixed point is no longer that of a regularly stable fixed
point, but rather an inward spiral. For other setups,
though, the eigenvalues are real, both with magnitude
lower than one, so that the fixed point is regularly stable,
as in the case with no mutations.
In the case of a dominant type, these are the only be-
haviors possible under the dynamics; Fig. 2 illustrates
typical trajectories of each.
In Fig. 3, for various mutation rates, we plot the re-
gions in the u˜12-u˜23 plane that are associated with fixed
points of the two stability types mentioned above. We
fix u˜13 = 0.53; thus, we are interested in setups with
u˜12 >
1
2
. Notice that the region for which the ‘new’ be-
havior occurs, i.e. for which the fixed point is no longer
regularly stable but rather a stable spiral, grows as we
increase µ.
2. The case of no dominant type
The general case that resulted in an unstable interior
fixed point when µ = 0 was taken to be u˜12 >
1
2
, u˜13 <
1
2
, u˜23 >
1
2
. With µ = 0, such setups lead to an unstable
interior fixed point; the trajectories are outward spirals,
with limit cycles at the boundary of the simplex. For
sufficiently low mutation rates, then, this is the behavior
of the system as well. (More precisely, for a given pay-
off matrix U˜ obeying the above condition, there exists
a positive number ε such that, if µ < ε, the trajectories
around the fixed point are outward spirals whose limit
cycle is arbitrarily close to the boundaries of the sim-
plex.) For larger values of µ, the behavior of the system
becomes more complex. Three types of behavior are pos-
sible; they are described below, along with the nature of
the eigenvalues of the Jacobian (evaluated at the fixed
point) that diagnoses the behavior near the fixed point
in each case. (The behavior away from the fixed point
can not be diagnosed using the eigenvalues; for this we
rely on numerical results.)
1. An unstable spiral near the fixed point, spiraling
outward to a limit cycle contained in the interior of
∆3. The diagnostic eigenvalue condition for the be-
havior near the fixed point is: Imλ1,2 6= 0, |λ1,2| >
1.
2. A stable spiral near the fixed point. In fact, tra-
jectories spiral inward to the fixed point from all
points in ∆3, so that it is globally attracting as
well. Diagnostic condition: Imλ1,2 6= 0, |λ1,2| < 1.
3. Non-spiral inward trajectories towards the fixed
point, which we term a ‘regularly stable fixed
point’. Diagnostic condition: Imλ1,2 = 0, |λ1,2| <
1.
Our numerical investigation reveals that, for a given
payoff matrix U˜, for very low mutation rates, the be-
havior is, as expected, that trajectories starting near the
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FIG. 2. The two types of behavior which can arise in the case of a dominant type. Panel (a) shows typical trajectories for the
case where the eigenvalues of the Jacobian, evaluated at the fixed point, are real, with magnitude less than unity; panel (b)
shows typical trajectories for the case where the eigenvalues of the Jacobian, evaluated at the fixed point, are complex, with
magnitude less than unity. For the latter trajectories, the inward spiral near the fixed point is so small as to be invisible on
the plot.
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FIG. 3. The case of a dominant type. Regions in the u˜12-u˜23 plane which result in fixed points of the various types, for various
mutation rates, fixing u˜13 = 0.53. The light regions correspond to regularly stable fixed points; the dark regions correspond to
stable spirals.
fixed point spiral outward to a limit cycle that is con-
tained in the interior of ∆3, while trajectories starting
outside the limit cycle spiral inward towards it. As we
increase µ slightly, the limit cycle shrinks, though the
behavior of the system does not change qualitatively. As
we continue to increase µ, at some point the limit cycle
shrinks to the fixed point. As we increase µ past this
value, the fixed point becomes the limit of inward spi-
raling trajectories. (Increasing µ still further – for most
payoff matrices, to very large values – the fixed point
eventually becomes regularly stable. Because we typi-
cally consider low mutation rates, and because the sta-
bility of the fixed point does not change, this result is not
of significant interest.)
This is diagnosed by the observation that the mag-
nitude of complex eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix,
evaluated at the fixed point, decreases through unity as
we increase µ through its critical value.
Thus, the system undergoes a supercritical Hopf bi-
furcation [25]: as we increase µ through some critical
value µ∗, the fixed point changes from an unstable spiral
to a stable spiral. Moreover, for most payoff matrices,
this occurs for relatively low values of µ. For example,
the critical value of µ in the case u˜12 = 0.7, u˜13 = 0.4,
u˜23 = 0.6 is µ
∗ = 0.0057. We shall see that, fixing u˜13,
for small values of u˜12 and u˜23 (i.e. close to
1
2
), the criti-
cal value of µ is very small, while for large values of u˜12
and u˜23 (i.e. close to 1), the critical value of µ is larger.
The significance of this result is clear: even very low
mutation rates can stabilize a system that is, in the ab-
sence of mutations, unstable. The population state in
the case of no mutations eventually oscillates wildly be-
tween near-pure states, but if we introduce even a very
low mutation rate, the population state instead eventu-
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FIG. 4. The stabilizing effect, through a Hopf bifurcation, of mutations in the case of no dominant type. Evolution of the
components of the population state over time for µ = 0 and µ = 0.008 > µ∗, for the case u˜12 = 0.7, u˜13 = 0.4, u˜23 = 0.6.
ally settles to a stable point of fixed proportions. Fig. 4
demonstrates these different behaviors, plotting the time
evolution of the population proportions for the case of
a zero mutation rate and the case of a mutation rate
slightly above the critical value. Fig. 5 illustrates the
Hopf bifurcation in the phase plane for the same payoff
matrix.
Fixing u˜13 = 0.4, and for various mutation rates, we
plot in Fig. 6 the regions in the u˜12-u˜23 plane for which
the types of behavior described above arise. The region
for which the original (zero mutation rate) behavior, that
of an unstable spiral, occurs, shrinks as we increase µ.
The boundary of the region within each plot corresponds
to the payoff matrices for which the value of µ in ques-
tion is the critical value. Notice that the payoff matrices
with the largest critical mutation rates are those with the
largest values for u˜12 and u˜23.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A. Review
We have presented a study of a purely competitive dy-
namics for 3-type games, arguing that such a dynam-
ics represents a characterization of how certain systems,
both natural and artificial, are governed.
Throughout, we maintained the assumptions of an infi-
nite population, and that the probability of advancement
of a certain type in an engagement with another is pro-
portional to that type’s payoff in the engagement. We
further assumed that, in each period, each agent is se-
lected for pairing, though the general model developed
in Sec. II allows for more general selection mechanisms,
and indeed for all these assumption to be relaxed.
Initially ignoring the possibility of mutations, we
showed that two types of behavior are possible for the
population state’s evolution, corresponding to two dif-
ferent types of payoff matrix. The first, where one of
the types is dominant (in the sense that in an engage-
ment with another type, it always receives the higher
payoff) the population state eventually comprises only
agents of the dominant type (unless it initially comprised
only agents of another type). If no type is dominant, on
the other hand, the components of the population state
(assuming it is not initially at the mixed-type fixed point,
the existence of which is guaranteed for payoff matrices
of this type) eventually fluctuate, in procession, between
being very close to zero and very close to unity.
Allowing for a nonzero mutation rate, our analysis be-
came predominantly numerical. We showed that, in the
case of a dominant type, the behavior of the system does
not differ significantly from that under the assumption of
a zero mutation rate. In particular, the population state
still tends to a globally attracting fixed point near domi-
nant type’s pure state. For the case of no dominant type,
the dynamics of the system does, in some cases, alter sig-
nificantly. For very low mutation rates, as expected, the
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FIG. 5. The stabilizing effect, through a Hopf bifurcation, of mutations in the case of no dominant type. Trajectories for (a)
µ = 0.002 < µ∗ and (b) µ = 0.007 > µ∗, in both cases for u˜12 = 0.70, u˜13 = 0.40, u˜23 = 0.60.
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FIG. 6. The case of no dominant type. Regions in the u˜12-u˜23 plane that result in fixed points of the various types, for various
mutation rates, fixing u˜13 = 0.4. The lightest regions correspond to unstable spirals; the mid-tone regions correspond to stable
spirals; and the darkest regions correspond to regularly stable fixed points.
system behaves as it does under the assumption of no
mutations; that is, the population state, if starting near
the fixed point in the interior, spirals outwards towards
a limiting cycle, so that, again, the proportions of the
types eventually fluctuate, in procession, with significant
amplitude. However, as we increase the mutation rate
for a given setup, at some point, the interior fixed point,
previously an outward spiral, becomes an inward spiral:
the system undergoes a Hopf bifurcation at some critical
value of µ. The result is that, for mutation rates larger
than the critical value, the fixed point is stable; the popu-
lation proportions eventually settle down to fixed values,
rather than continuing to fluctuate, as in the case of zero
or very low mutation rates. Moreover, this critical value
was shown to be relatively low for most setups, so that
this effect should not be thought of as pathological. That
even a very low mutation rate can alter the behavior of
the system so significantly – indeed, entirely reversing
its instability – is a result of both theoretical and prac-
tical interest, and it would certainly be worth exploring
the significance of this result in the context of real-world
dynamical systems.
B. Possibilities for future study
In considering the possibilities for extension of the
analysis carried out here, we naturally turn to the sim-
plifying assumptions we have made, and ask whether the
relaxation of any of them could yield further insight into
these dynamics.
First, we assumed throughout that θ = 1. Increasing
the value of this parameter serves to favor the stronger
type in a pairing, in the sense that the probability that
the stronger type propagates its type to its offspring in-
creases as we increase θ. Of interest is the limiting case
θ =∞, where in a given pairing, the offspring receive
with certainty the type of the stronger parent. Intuition
suggests that, in the case of a dominant type, that type’s
predominance in terms of its proportion in the long term
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population state would be increased relative to the case
where θ = 1 (for nonzero mutation rates, of course – for
a zero mutation rate, we would expect the long term out-
come to be that type’s pure state, regardless of θ). In the
case of no dominant type, it is not clear whether the dy-
namics observed for θ = 1 would be preserved for θ =∞,
though a numerical investigation would be revealing in
this regard.
Second, our assumption that in each period, each agent
is selected for mating (φi ≡ 1), can be weakened to one
where an agent’s selection for mating is dependent on
its fitness. In this sense, the dynamics would no longer
be purely competitive, since an agent’s fitness, or average
payoff, depends in part on its payoff in engagements with
agents of its own type. This would align the dynamics
more with the replicator dynamics [5]; whether the resul-
tant behavior would more closely resemble that for the
dynamics we considered here or the replicator dynamics
could be investigated numerically.
Finally, the assumption of an infinite population was
maintained throughout, allowing probabilities and real-
ized proportions to be equated. Of interest would be an
investigation of the effect of a finite population on the
results above; we might expect the behavior of very large
populations to resemble that of an infinite population,
but would small populations also exhibit such behavior?
Indeed, a preliminary analysis carried out by the authors,
making use of simulations of finite population cases, sug-
gests that for some setups, the long run behavior of the
population state is qualitatively different for small popu-
lations (say, N = 20) than larger ones (say, N = 200). A
more detailed investigation of the finite population case
will be carried out in later work.
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